Shadowed Walls: Notes from the American Cave

The Social Compact: Three Essays

I

Philosophical

You have spoken before of the modern theory of the Social Compact. You note that, apart from other difficulties, one of the most damning criticisms one may level against it is that it has as its principle the notion that political authority arises from the consent of the governed. Yet I fail to see how this is a problem. After all, whether one is living today or in the times of the ancients and mediaevals, men must consent to be ruled, must they not? But if this is so, it seems that men like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and the American Founders were simply elaborating upon, and imitating, both the thought and the practice of their predecessors.

You are correct. Men must consent to be ruled. This has always been and always shall be the case. There is a profound difference between the way in which the ancients and mediaevals understood the nature of consent, and the way in which the moderns understand it. In other words, “consent of the governed” has an equivocal signification.

Bluntly stated, the difference amounts to this: for the ancients and mediaevals, consent of the governed is a condition for rule. For the moderns, however, consent of the governed is a principle of rule.

What do I mean by this? An example will serve to help. A good father needs the consent of his teen-age sons that he may rule them. He needs, in other words, that his two sons either implicitly or explicitly acknowledge that there is something in the nature of things which justifies the father’s exercise of authority. This “something” is the fact that there is present in the father an understanding, or a virtue, or a form of goodness, if you will, which renders the father superior to the sons. It is only in virtue of this innate superiority that the father rules rightly, or that the sons can find in themselves the wherewithal to submit to the sometimes unpleasant realities of corrective punishment. This submission to the rule of the father requires “consent” of the sons. Absent this consent, no rule can take place. If the sons rebel or run away – if, in a word, they refuse to submit to the superior virtue of the father – then no rule can take place. In a sense, all political authority requires the “consent of the governed.” And this is the sense in which the ancients and mediaevals understood the phrase.

On the surface of things, the case with the moderns seems similar. Yet it is a false similarity. For the modern political theorists, the “consent of the governed’ in no manner whatsoever implies an innate superiority in the one who is chosen to rule. This cannot be so, for these men hold it as a self-evident “truth” that “all men are created equal.” They are equal with respect to their lives, their liberties, their properties, and their right to “pursue happiness.” We have seen, however, that this equality – at least with respect to what these men call “liberty” – cannot be a moral equality. Outside the polity, morality is a word only. Morality arises with the creation, by convention, of the State. Morality is therefore conventional [24].

Hence the liberty of which the modern political theorists speak must be the natural liberty possessed in virtue of man’s rational nature. Understood thus, they speak correctly. Understood thus, all men are indeed “created equal.” And yet this notion of natural liberty or equality was not, for Aristotle and St. Thomas, what justifies one man’s rule over another; only the possession of a certain superior virtue justifies rulership. Hence, in a traditional thought, the difference between the ruler and ruled is a difference of kind. 

This is not so with the moderns. For the latter, the difference between ruler and ruled is a difference in degree. It can only be a difference in degree because, again, in the original state of nature all men are equal. The ruler, so called, is simply the one, or few, or many to whom the compacting individuals consign a portion of the “natural rights.” [25]. The compacting individuals thereby “alienate” from themselves certain equal portions of what they all equally possess.

In this way, two things are accomplished. First, each of the consenting individuals remains equal to every other. Having begun with equal rights, and having handed over an equal and like portion of such to the men they have chosen to carry on the business of government, the non-governmental parties remain in the same relationship to one another. “If equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders are equal.” Moreover, once the compact is made, the ruler, having acquired these parcels of right, now possesses a greater concentration of power than any given individual, or even the whole society. Thus the inequality between ruler and ruled is quantitative, not qualitative: or, in more familiar words, a difference not of kind, but of degree.

Secondly, the contracting individuals, not recognizing an innate superiority in any individual or group of individuals, do each, together or individually, retain  the right to judge the prescriptions or laws handed down by the newly-created political authority. If the political authority. If the political authority acts contrary to what the contracting individuals deem to be in their self-interest, the contracting individuals may terminate the Social Compact. They may end the old one at will, and, should the choose to do so, begin a new one at will. It is, quite literally, completely arbitrary. What the contracting parties will, will be the measure of all things. What the contracting parties will, will be the measure of right and wrong, good and evil. In brief, not only man, but each individual man, is the measure of everything and anything [26].

In this respect, then, such parties are like two sons who will allow their father to rule only if the father gives them what they desire. To continue the analogy: not only do the sons, in principle at least, “create” the father; but also, should it be judged in keeping with their self-interest, the sons may form a compact one with another against the”tyrant” or nuisance, and may rightly kill the father. This they may do, moreover, without any violation of justice or the law of nature; for, according to the modern understanding of this law, “all men are created equal.” None is in principle the superior of another, and thus none has the right to rule without the “consent” of the other. But since the sons did not consent to being created in the first place, the father’s authority would be arbitrary by nature, ungrounded in the wills of his “subjects”. Hence, with all impunity and in all good conscience, the sons may as it were quietly load their shotguns, and then, free from guilt and with full understanding of what they are about to do, they may stroll into the living room and discharge both barrels in their father’s face. And, given the modern understanding of whence authority arises, they will have been “justified” in doing so. It was, after all, their “right” [27].

So, agian, the difference between the consent of the governed as understood by the ancients and mediaevals on the one hand, and the consent of the governed as understood by the moderns on the other, is the difference between a condition of rule and a principle of rule. It is a difference which, in speech, is a difference of two words. In the reality of life, however, it is a difference of two worlds.

“It must be observed, however, that if the faith were endangered, a subject ought to rebuke his prelate even publicly.”  – St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-II, q. 33, a. 4

♣

Even now, almost three years after the election of Jorge Bergoglio to the Chair of St. Peter, orthodox Catholic thinkers continue daily to strain at swarms of gnats while swallowing entire a camel of gargantuan proportions.  The nature of the gnats? Episode after episode after episode wherein Bergoglio, in both act and word, continues to spread confusion if not scandal regarding the teachings and essence of the Roman Catholic Church.  And the nature of the camel?  The ongoing assumption that – despite the above-referenced episodes –  this Argentinian peronista, this South American paragon of theological turmoil, is actually a pope.  

Still, how could the situation have turned out otherwise?  After all, early in his pontificate Bergoglio pointedly revealed himself for what he truly is, and yet few if any observers were prepared for a revelation so unpleasant.  Few if any called him out, for the implications were too alarming.  It was as if all these orthodox writers chose to play religious analogues to BBC correspondents describing the bloody events at the Bataclan concert hall in Paris or the downtown Civic Center in San Bernardino:  “No Islamic – or heretical and anti-Catholic – influence here.  Everyone just keep on moving.”

And yet, lest anyone forget, Bergoglio clearly intimated – No, made explicit – the principle or cause of all his doctrinal disorientation.  He did so mere months after his election. And he did so during his notorious twelve-thousand word interview with a prominent Italian journalist, the atheist Eugenio Scalfari of La Repubblica.

♣

Three quotations from that interview have since garnered enormous attention; and these quotations have, in turn, elicited a multitude of apologiae from an increasingly embarrassed Catholic commentariat.  To wit:

1. “Proselytism is solemn nonsense.”
2. “Everyone has his own idea of good and evil and must choose to follow the good and fight evil as he conceives them.”
3. “And I believe in God.  Not in a Catholic God.  There is no Catholic God.”

At first glance these quotations, taken simply by themselves and without regard to context, immediately invite the following judgements:   

The first quotation is an explicit rejection of Christ’s Great Commission (Matthew 28: 16-20).  As such it is heresy pure and simple.

The second quotation follows logically from what is implicit in the first.  It is an expression of religious and moral relativism.  More precisely, it is an enunciation of religious Indifferentism.  As such – and like the first quotation – it is heresy pure and simple.

The third quotation constitutes an explicit rejection of two thousand years of Church teaching.  It also implicitly condemns – as at best misguided – the innumerable sacrifices and martyrdoms of those who, since the time of St. Stephen and the Apostles, have defended such teaching.  As such the statement constitutes more than heresy pure and simple.  As such the statement constitutes a public act of apostasy.

♣

As already indicated, upon reading this interview, orthodox Catholic commentators suffered what can only be described as a deer-in-the-headlights moment.  And for understandable reasons.  Were the aforementioned charges of heresy or apostasy confirmed to be true, such would constitute (arguably) the most grievous crisis in the history of the Catholic Church.  The resulting damage to the Faith would be incalculable.

Hence (again, for understandable reasons) after the interview these same commentators unleashed a veritable snowstorm of expositions, clarifications, interpretations and elucidations.  And all was undertaken with an eye toward making things right, toward making things doctrinally correct.

To their credit, most of these writers (I here speak of orthodox Catholic thinkers) did not defend the statements themselves.  But they did defend Bergoglio.  More precisely, they insisted that the Bergoglio portrayed in this interview was (1) grievously misquoted; or that (2) he was simply awkward and careless in his choice of words; or that – at worst – (3) he was materially but not formally heretical.

Subsequent events, however, belie the first two of these defenses.  For instance, when asked about the possibility that Scalfari had taken liberties with the Pope’s words, the Vatican press director, Fr. Federico Lombardi, instead insisted that the recorded interview “was overall faithful to the pope’s thought.”  As for the possibility that Bergoglio was awkward or careless in his choice of words, the Vatican virtually eliminated such a possibility when L’Osservatore Romano itself published the interview in full. Moreover the Vatican website later included the interview among the pope’s catalogued speeches, but did so only after painstakingly translating it into no fewer than six languages.

This leaves only the third defense.  Bergoglio – so this argument goes – is at worst materially heretical.  In other words he was speaking heretically but he did not know he was speaking heretically.  However, were he to know he was speaking heretically; and were he to persist in or fail to retract such speech; then (the argument concedes) he would be formally heretical and therefore no longer a pope.  And yet (the argument insists) such has not been shown to be the case.  

We disagree.

♣

To repeat:  Bergoglio declared, “And I believe in God.  Not in a Catholic God.  There is no Catholic God.”  

When Bergoglio insists that there is no Catholic God, either 1) he knows what is signified by the word, “Catholic” or 2) he does not know what is signified by the word, “Catholic.”  

1. If he knows what is signified by the word, “Catholic”, then he is knowingly rejecting the perennial teaching of the Church.  And this knowing rejection is the very definition of formal heresy.  Furthermore, formal heresy ipso facto places one outside the Church.  But one outside the Church cannot legitimately obtain, let alone exercise, the powers of any ecclesiastical office within the Church.  Least of all can one legitimately obtain or exercise the powers of the papacy itself.  And all this, again, because one, by virtue of formal heresy, is no longer a member of the Church. One is extra Ecclesiam.  And being extra Ecclesiam, one cannot possibly obtain or exercise any office intra Ecclesiam.  

Hence one in such a state cannot legitimately lay claim to, nor exercise the powers of, the papal office.  

2.  If he does not know what is signified by the word, “Catholic”, then, after so many years in seminary, in post-graduate studies, in the office of priest, bishop and cardinal, he is doubtlessly suffering from an ignorance the Church defines as invincible.  But a man suffering from invincible ignorance is, by this very condition, incapacitated for holding the office of priest, bishop, cardinal or pope. The reason is obvious:  each of the aforementioned offices – but especially the office of bishop or pope – imposes, as sine qua non for discharging the duties thereof, the burden of teaching Catholic doctrine.  But one cannot teach what one does not know.  Therefore one in a state of invincible ignorance cannot legitimately occupy such offices.  More particularly, one in a state of invincible ignorance cannot legitimately occupy the office of the papacy.  

Hence one in such a state cannot legitimately lay claim to, nor exercise the powers of, the papal office.  

Ergo:  Whether Bergoglio knows what is signified by the word, “Catholic”, or whether Bergoglio does not know what is signified by the word, “Catholic”, he cannot legitimately lay claim to, nor exercise the powers of, the papal office.   Hence his occupancy of the papal office is nothing other than a Usurpation.

♣

In a last-ditch effort to defend Bergoglio’s orthodoxy – and therefore legitimacy as pope – some commentators have resorted to the notion of context.  “He was taken out of context!” is their cry.  To formulate an answer to this “cry”, however, one need only read the questionable quotation in its larger setting.  (Such is provided in the excerpt appended below.)  Yet upon doing so one will discover that the larger setting itself provides evidence equally if not more damning than all of the above-analyses.

At the very least the context reveals a mind tragically confused, tragically ignorant.  It is as if (say) Oprah Winfrey, while under the influence of hashish and on the spur of a moment, were to seek and receive immediate admittance into the Catholic Church, and receive immediate admittance without any doctrinal preparation whatsoever. Now imagine her the following day – on television and still reeking of her bong – vehemently preaching her new-found but utterly misunderstood “faith.”  Our embarrassment for her and the Faith would be without limit.  And yet her words would simply mimic those of Bergoglio himself.  Yet with respect to Bergoglio himself, such words – as already indicated – would and do reveal not mere ignorance but invincible ignorance.

But what if Bergoglio’s mind is not tragically confused, is not tragically ignorant? Then his speech can only be intentionally misleading, intentionally evasive, intentionally equivocal.  But speech intentionally misleading or evasive or equivocal is itself grounds for condemnation.   It is grounds for condemnation because, with regard to the Faith itself, the act of intentional deception is the act of a wolf.  More precisely, and with regard to the person of Bergoglio, it is the act of a wolf in sheep’s clothing.  It is therefore the act of a poseur of the deadliest kind, for it is the act of a public apostate enrobed with the stolen vestments of Catholic orthodoxy.

The conclusion is inescapable.  Whatever the state of Bergoglio’s mind, his is a mind not possessed by Catholic orthodoxy, nor is his a mind constrained by any “hermeneutic of continuity”.  No, Bergoglio’s is a mind possessed by something altogether different.  And this “something altogether different” – together with the man himself – merits not further explication and still less justification.  Instead both merit immediate and absolute Renunciation.        

C. I.

January 2016

________________________________

Bergoglio:  “But now let me ask you a question: you, a secular non-believer in God, what do you believe in? You are a writer and a man of thought. You believe in something, you must have a dominant value. Don’t answer me with words like honesty, seeking, the vision of the common good, all important principles and values but that is not what I am asking. I am asking what you think is the essence of the world, indeed the universe. You must ask yourself, of course, like everyone else, who we are, where we come from, where we are going. Even children ask themselves these questions. And you?”

Scalfari:  I am grateful for this question. The answer is this: I believe in Being, that is in the tissue from which forms, bodies arise.

Bergoglio:  “And I believe in God, not in a Catholic God, there is no Catholic God.   There is God and I believe in Jesus Christ, his incarnation. Jesus is my teacher and my pastor, but God, the Father, Abba, is the light and the Creator. This is my Being. Do you think we are very far apart?”

Scalfari:  We are distant in our thinking, but similar as human beings, unconsciously animated by our instincts that turn into impulses, feelings and will, thought and reason. In this we are alike.

Bergoglio:  “But can you define what you call Being?”

Scalfari:  Being is a fabric of energy. Chaotic but indestructible energy and eternal chaos. Forms emerge from that energy when it reaches the point of exploding. The forms have their own laws, their magnetic fields, their chemical elements, which combine randomly, evolve, and are eventually extinguished but their energy is not destroyed. Man is probably the only animal endowed with thought, at least in our planet and solar system. I said that he is driven by instincts and desires but I would add that he also contains within himself a resonance, an echo, a vocation of chaos.

Bergoglio:  “All right. I did not want you to give me a summary of your philosophy and what you have told me is enough for me. From my point of view, God is the light that illuminates the darkness, even if it does not dissolve it, and a spark of divine light is within each of us. In the letter I wrote to you, you will remember I said that our species will end but the light of God will not end and at that point it will invade all souls and it will all be in everyone.”